China has hit their bright-red censor button...again. The victim this time: the New York Times (NYT) website and any searches for the U.S. newspaper on Chinese social networking sites. One would assume some awful event prompted the government to crack down on the information flow, like when environmental abuses were uncovered. But it wasn't. The article was actually about the wealth of the Chinese Premier and his family. (Al-Jazeera: "China Blocks NY Times Website")
Apparently, the Premier has maintained a "good-ol-boy" image, claiming to be one to fight the rampant abuses within the government, so the article was an embarrassment to both him and the communist party. Historically, China has censored media that did not support the Party line and image (like their Soviet predecessors), so it is no surprise that this article would be enough reason to shut down the website of one of the most recognizable names in journalism. However, after our discussion of Sangeet Kumar's "Google Earth and the Nation-State", I saw how the incident illustrated the issues of sovereignty in the new media age.
Kumar wrote that networks, such as news media, "decenters sovereignty", and this challenge happens because the information is "disembodied from its material medium" (Global Media and Communication 6 (2010): 157-158). There is a threat in what we cannot see or touch, so the Internet is a scary place for information to be published and accessed instantaneously around the world. Yet, as the Internet has a "borderless architecture", states can't implement laws the way they once did, which makes them vulnerable (ibid., 158-159). According to Kumar, this is why the Internet has become a battleground for many states, and his example of Google vs. India shows the new power nation states must face in non-state actors with an online presence.
One could assume this new environment would be particularly alarming for a state like China. It is a state that has controlled information within its borders with an iron fist, but would also like to be part of the modern economic and political regime. To do that, China has to have all the modern information technologies, which includes the Internet, and thus be connected to the resultant networks. So how will China balance keeping its sovereignty against these "non-state actors" while simultaneously allowing access to the global information networks it must be connected to in order to be a major international player?
Apparently shutting down specific websites as threats emerge is China's current plan. However, because they are connected to the global information network, the world can take note of every time the Party inhibits the built-in free-flow of the Internet. Can states like China, North Korea, and others that censor information continue to fight the Internet piecemeal? Or will the Internet win in the end because of its disembodied nature? As more and more incidents of China blocking, shutting down, and censoring websites become global knowledge, the Chinese government will have to decide if they want to be part of the global networks, or if they want to maintain their historical control (or sovereignty) over information.
Dianna,
ReplyDeleteI thought this was a very thorough analysis of the situation and provided a perfect example of the ways certain regimes must negotiate between sovereignty and inclusion in the worldwide media network.
The topic of China and the internet always makes me wonder if internet censorship is really as big of a deal over there as we think it is. Not in the sense that it does not happen or that it is not a part of the regime's attempt at controlling the flow of information accessible to their citizens, I recognize both of those points as true and relevant. However, I know people in China that do access forbidden websites such as Facebook through proxy servers and information does flow between China and the rest of the world in both directions (as opposed to North Korea), this makes me wonder then, what kind of role, and how big of a role, the global network and its tools of interconnectedness will play in any sort of political transition in China. Will the regime really be forced to change because of these pressures? Or, are "old-school" pressures like those exerted against the Soviet Union win out? Have we really reached a point where the importance of the flow of information will supersede other pressures on the state?
Thanks for your comment, Olga. You bring up several valid points that do complicate the issue of China's Internet policy. Firstly, China is a special case in comparison to other regimes like Iran and North Korea in that it does have a two way flow of information. And like every human being, Chinese have used their resources to gain access to the information that they want, despite firewalls.
ReplyDeleteWill the flow of information itself cause huge political upheaval in China? I too am skeptical about that. However, I do think that it is an issue that could lead to changes in information policy. Whether the consequences of policy change will be political change, that is another debate entirely. But we can discern from the Internet debate in China that easy access to information (and its related technology) is putting new pressures on states which have no precedents.
Lastly, I am intrigued by your comment on censorship maybe not being "such a big deal" within China as it is to us in Western states. We probably focus on China more than on other regimes because there is some two-way flow of information, which makes it easier for us to debate the issue more openly. It is possible that the people within China see censorship as commonplace, and it is just outside parties that are making this a major point of contention. But I am sure it would be a big deal to regular Chinese citizens if because of the difficulties that accompany Internet control, the Internet was cut off entirely. Unlikely, but I used the extreme example to illustrate how China, and other nations, will end up in a pickle in how they eventually decide to create policy around the Internet.